

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SALT T 01740 01 OF 02 152019Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2271

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1740

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 15, 1974

(SALT TWO - 414)

REF: SALT TWO GENEVA 1731

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING CONVERSATIONS FOCUSED ON ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT, FBS, BOMBERS, NUMBER OF FIXED ICBMS, AND INCLUDED SOME DISCUSSION OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS ON U.S. FORCE PLANS. END SUMMARY.

2. ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT. SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN, A-506) SAID FOR THE MOMENT THE SIDES SHOULD PUT ASIDE THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. BROWN AGREED ON THE BASIS THAT IT WAS A NECESSARY BUT FOR THE MOMENT SEPARABLE CONSIDERATION. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD PUT ITS MIRV ICBM PROPOSALS IN A WAY THAT THE SOVIETS FOUND HARD TO ACCEPT: THE SOVIET SIDE HAS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF ICBM MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT BEFORE THE U.S. CAN CONSIDER SLBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT, WHICH THE SOVIETS CONSIDER A VERY IMPORTANT SUBJECT. BROWN SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE FELT THAT WAY, IT MIGHT WANT TO MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT FOR THE MOMENT ALL THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION COULD TELL ITS AUTHORITIES WAS THAT
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PAGE 02 SALT T 01740 01 OF 02 152019Z

THE US DELEGATION HAD INDICATED THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ICBM MIRV

THROW-WEIGHT EQUALITY WAS A KEY WHICH HAD TO BE TURNED BEFORE SLBMS COULD BE CONSIDERED; THIS APPEARS IN THE NATURE OF AN ULTIMATUM AND MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROCEED. BROWN REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL SINCE THE U.S. FORMULATION DID MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERED THE TWO TO BE CONNECTED.

3. FBS. SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN, A-566) SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL POSITION ON FBS WAS THE ONE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD GIVEN REPEATEDLY AT SALT, SPECIFICALLY THE SOLUTION OF WITHDRAWAL. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SHCHUKIN COULD SAY THAT THE REAL CONDITION WAS THAT A SOLUTION WAS NEEDED IN ORDER TO REACH A SALT AGREEMENT BUT IT NEED NOT BE THE ONE THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENTED. ONE POSSIBLE NEGOTIABLE FEATURE WAS THAT OF TIMING, BUT FBS MUST BE RESOLVED DURING THIS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IF THERE WAS TO BE AN AGREEMENT.

4. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-567) SAID THE PURPOSE OF SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES IS TO PROTECT THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES. HE SAID THAT U.S. FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT CANNOT DEFEND NATO ALLIES; THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS MUST DO THIS. KLOSSON ASKED THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERED U.S. EUROPE-BASED AIRCRAFT TO BE SO VULNERABLE OR SO IN-EFFECTIVE, THEN WHY DID THE SOVIET DELEGATION SHOW SO MUCH CONCERN ABOUT THESE WEAPONS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPEARED TO BE A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY TO HANDLE THE QUESTION SO THAT THE TWO DELEGATIONS COULD ADDRESS THE MAIN QUESTION POSED BY THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

5. GRINEVSKY SAID IN HIS VIEW THE ROLE OF AMERICAN FBS AIRCRAFT WAS THAT OF A HOSTAGE. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT PROPOSING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES FROM EUROPE. THEREFORE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WOULD REMAIN. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER US NUCLEAR FORCES FROM EUROPE WOULD RESULT IN A CHANGE BOTH IN THE REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE AND IN POLITICAL TERMS SINCE IT WOULD LEAD TO THE PERCEPTION IN WESTERN EUROPE OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO PERSUADE ITS ALLIES THAT THEIR SECURITY IS STILL BEING SAFEGUARDED BY AMERICAN CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES. (COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S ARGUMENT COULD BE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT FBS IS IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS BUT FBS IS NOT IMPORTANT TO NATO.)

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PAGE 03 SALT T 01740 01 OF 02 152019Z

6. TRUSOV AND BELETSKY (WITH ROWNY, A-568) CONTINUED THE MATHEMATICAL ANALOGIES BROUGHT UP AT TODAY'S MEETING. ROWNY REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT AGREE TO THE NUMBERS ASSIGNED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. BUT FROM AN ANALYTICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE SIDES WERE MAKING PROGRESS; BOTH WERE REALIZING THAT THERE WERE SOME SYSTEMS MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS, AND THAT THE NUMBER WAS FINITE. A FINITE NUMBER GAVE THE SIDES A WAY OF AVOIDING ENDLESS DEBATE. TRUSOV REPLIED THAT WHERE IT

WAS NECESSARY TO PLACE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE VALUES ON NUMBERS, THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT FOR ARRIVING AT MATHEMATICAL EQUALITIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SIDES COULD HAVE MORE "SOBER" DISCUSSIONS IF SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE CONFINED TO LIMITING SYSTEMS UPON WHICH THE SIDES COULD MUTUALLY AGREE. ROWNY AGREED.

7. BOMBERS. BROWN (TO SHCHUKIN, A-566) INDICATED THAT IN HIS OPINION AN EXCESS OF UNMIRVED THROW-WEIGHT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY AN EXCESS OF BOMBER PAYLOAD ON THE PART OF THE US, TO PRODUCE AN EQUIVALENCE IN THESE FACTORS. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT BOMBER PAYLOAD SHOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE HEAVY BOMBERS BUT THAT OF THE CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT. FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT COULD BE INCLUDED OR HANDLED IN A SEPARATE SOLUTION OF THE KIND HE HAD SAID WAS NECESSARY IF THE SIDES WERE TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT.

8. BROWN ARGUED THE NECESSITY TO INCLUDE SOVIET MEDIUM BOMBERS AND OTHER SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS IF US NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS WERE TO BE BROUGHT IN. BROWN SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SIDES WERE TO EXCLUDE THE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS' CAPABILITY TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON THE US WITH THEIR OTHER SYSTEMS WOULD EXCEED THE US ABILITY TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION WITH NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

9. SHCHUKIN THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW ONE SHOULD COMPARE BOMBER PAYLOAD WITH MISSILE PAYLOAD. BROWN SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION, ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BY HIGHER POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE BASED ON SU

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PAGE 01 SALT T 01740 02 OF 02 152105Z

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1740

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THAT AIR DEFENSES CANNOT DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST MISSILES WHEREAS ABMS CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST MISSILES. THUS THE AIR DEFENSE

SHOULD NOT BE WEIGHED HEAVILY. IN REPLY, BROWN SAID THAT SOME AIR DEFENSES (AWACS AND LONG RANGE INTERCEPTORS) COULD SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME IN THE AIR AND THUS BE INVULNERABLE AS BALLISTIC MISSILES.

10. SHCHUKIN SUGGESTED THAT THE COEFFICIENT RELATING BOMBER AND MISSILE PAYLOAD COULD BE AS HIGH AS UNITED. THAT IS, BOMBER PAYLOAD COULD BE AS EFFECTIVE AS MISSILE PAYLOAD. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN ANY EVEN SUCH A CALCULATION WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK, AND THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO UNDERTAKE IT UNLESS HE COULD BE ASSURED THAT THE RESULTS OF SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE US CONGRESS AS A WAY OF ARRIVING AT AN AGREEMENT. BROWN REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT ASSURE HIM OF THAT, AND IN HIS OPINION SUCH A CALCULATION WAS NOT THE WAY TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT BUT RATHER OF SUPPORTING IT AFTER IT IS MADE. THE NUMBERS IN THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN MAY 1972 WERE NOT ARRIVED AT BY SUCH A CALCULATION.

11. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED. ANY DEPARTURE FROM THAT POSITION WOULD REQUIRE EVIDENCE OF ACCEPTANCE

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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01740 02 OF 02 152105Z

BY THE OTHER SIDE OF THE METHOD. BROWN REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE US SIDE COULD JUSTIFY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS THE IDEA THAT ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE EQUATION OF SOVIET AND US FORCE CAPABILITY THERE WOULD BE SEVERAL TERMS WHICH DO NOT EQUAL THEIR CORRESPONDING TERMS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION TERM BY TERM. BUT OVERALL THE TWO SIDES OF THE EQUATION WOULD BE JUDGED EQUAL IN MILITARY TERMS AND IN POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS. A CALCULATION OF THE KIND HE WAS DESCRIBING COULD PLAY SOME PART IN SUCH AN APPROACH. AS TO THE COEFFICIENT, BROWN ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP 10 TONS OF MISSILE PAYLOAD IN ORDER TO GET 10 TONS OF ADDITIONAL BOMBER PAYLOAD. OR, ALTERNATIVELY, WOULD THE SOVIET MILITARY SEE IT AS NOT THREATENING IF THE US WERE TO TAKE A LARGE NUMBER OF 10 TON BOMBER PAYLOADS AND REPLACE THEM BY 10 TON ICBM PAYLOADS. THE QUESTION WENT UNANSWERED, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE MEETING WAS BREAKING UP.

12. (AT SOVIET LUNCHEON MARCH 14, SHELEPIN (WITH MENDELSON, A-562) FOCUSED ON THE US OFFER TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC ALLOWANCE FOR BOMBERS AND ON THE CONCRETE VALUE WHICH COULD BE ASSIGNED TO THESE SYSTEMS. MENDELSON POINTED OUT THAT THE US CONSIDERED IT MORE IMPORTANT TO AGREE TO THE CONCEPT OF ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL BUT IF SHELEPIN WANTED TO START ESTABLISHING VALUES FOR THROW-WEIGHT AND PAYLOAD, IT WOULD BE SIMPLER TO START WITH THOSE MISSILE SYSTEMS WHOSE THROW-WEIGHT VALUES WERE EASIER TO ESTABLISH. MENDELSON DREW A US/USSR COLUMN AND ASKED IF SHELEPIN WISHED TO FILL IN THE COLUMN WITH A VALUE FOR SOVIET MISSILES. SHELEPIN IMMEDIATELY DECLINED, BUT MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL OVERALL THROW-WEIGHT AGGREGATES

SEEMD TO INDICATE REDUCED US CONCERN WITH SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES.)

13. NUMBER OF FIXED ICBMS. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-567) SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A US QUESTION EARLIER, ASKING WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDED TO PRESERVE THE FIGURES OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR BOTH SOVIET ICBMS AND SLBMS. SEMENOV TODAY HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE OCTOBER 9 SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT ENVISAGED THAT THE NUMBER OF FIXED ICBMS ON THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE DATE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD BE THE FIGURE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MINUS ANY ICBMS THAT HAD BEEN RETIRED IN ORDER TO BE REPLACED BY SLBMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

14. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS. BROWN (WITH SHCHUKIN,
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PAGE 03 SALT T 01740 02 OF 02 152105Z

A-566) RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE HAD SEEN SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS ON US FORCE PLANS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THEIR LINK TO SALT. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD OBTAINED THE DOCUMENTS FROM NITZE AND HAD READ THEM CAREFULLY. BROWN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW WERE AWARE OF THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THESE DOCUMENTS; THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSALS THAT THE US DELEGATION WAS PUTTING FORTH WAS TO LIMIT ANOTHER ROUND IN THE ARMS COMPETITION, DURING WHICH THERE COULD BE A BIG INCREASE IN US FORCES.

15. FOR EXAMPLE, BROWN SAID, A PROGRAM TO PUT BIGGER MISSILES IN THE MINUTEMAN HOLES FALLS IN THIS CATEGORY. SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS WOULD UNDERCUT WHATEVER REAL OR IMAGINARY ADVANTAGES MIGHT ACCRUE TO THE SOVIET UNION AS A RESULT OF ITS RECENT EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS. IN BROWN'S VIEW THE ADVANTAGES TO EACH SIDE OF SUCH ADDITIONS WERE QUESTIONABLE, AT LEAST MILITARILY, BUT WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL GAINS THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND COULD BE MORE THAN COUNTER BALANCED IF THERE WAS NO FOLLOW-ON SALT AGREEMENT AND THE US RESPONDED WITH SIMILAR PROGRAMS OF ITS OWN. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE HAD CAREFULLY FORWARDED TO MOSCOW THE SCHLESINGER STATEMENTS, ALONG WITH A COMMENTARY OF HIS OWN.

16. (IN CONNECTION WITH LIMITING US-SOVIET ARMS COMPETITION, SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN, A-566) AT SOVIET-HOSTED LUNCHEON MARCH 14, SAID THERE REMAINED SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES AMONG VARIOUS PEOPLE ON THE SOVIET SIDE. WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW BEFORE COMING TO THIS SESSION OF SALT, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE HAD WORKED ON TRYING TO BRING A NUMBER OF PEOPLE AROUND TO HIS POINT OF VIEW.)

17. (RECESS. AT SOVIET MARCH 14 LUNCHEON, SHELEPIN QUESTIONED MENDELSON (A-562) RATHER EXTENSIVELY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A RECESS EITHER AT THE END OF MARCH OR BY EASTER. HE CAST HIS INTEREST IN A RECESS IN TERMS OF WISHING TO RETURN TO HIS FAMILY, BUT ALSO INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE MOSCOW SEVERAL WEEKS TO RE-GROUP AND ISSUE NEW INSTRUCTIONS AFTER THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. WHILE HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ON THIS, HE CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT

MOSCOW MIGHT NOT BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO THE US PROPOSAL FOR
AT LEAST ANOTHER MONTH.) JOHNSON

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